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Douglas A. Riggs*
Elizabeth K. Dorminey**
The Case for Revision of Section 7
of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the basic antitrust law affecting merg-
ers, today fails to promote competition and consumer welfare. In fact,
it often works to subvert these goals, becoming a tool for companies to
use against their competitors.
After nearly one hundred years, the purpose of our antitrust laws
should be clear: they should promote competition and protect the con-
sumer. But some of these laws, as currently written, are a source of
confusion. This confusion impedes progress toward the very goals
which motivated their enactment. Reasoned and moderate reforms
which eliminate ambiguity will return the antitrust laws to their basic
goals of promoting competition, efficiency, and consumer well-being.
The Reagan Administration has proposed the Merger Modernization
Act of 1986 to remedy specific shortcomings of this law. Currently,
Section 7 prohibits mergers and acquisitions where "the effect... may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly."1 Under the bill, a merger would be barred only if there is a sig-
nificant probability that the transaction would enable firms in the
relevant market to exercise market power. Market power is defined as
the ability to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time.2
The bill also would require courts to consider important economic
factors that are relevant to determining whether a proposed merger
will produce anticompetitive effects. These factors include the
number and size of firms already in the industry, the ease or difficulty
of entry by foreign or domestic firms, the ability of smaller firms al-
ready in the market to increase production in response to an attempt
to exercise market power, the nature of the product and terms of sale,
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the conduct of firms in the market, and the efficiencies which would
flow from the merger or acquisition.
Enforcement practices since the 1950s have been preoccupied with
local or regional market concentration. But international competition
has accelerated dramatically, and enforcers have failed to take market
changes into account. The result is that firms under considerable
pressure from foreign competitors may be barred from merging on the
very limited basis of their domestic market share. A particularly jar-
ring case in point is that of Paccar, a domestic manufacturer of large
trucks which, in 1981, held 18% of the U.S. market. Paccar was con-
templating the acquisition of another truck firm and considered, in
turn, Freightliner, which then had a 13% market share; Mack, with
18%; and White, with less than 13%. Paccar was advised by counsel
that it should not buy any of the three firms, because the resulting
company would have too large a share of the domestic market. The
result of this decision was that Freightliner and Mack were acquired
by the two largest truck manufacturers in the world: Daimler-Benz of
Germany, and Renault of France. White was purchased by Volvo of
Sweden.
But the impact of this decision was not limited to this transaction.
Cummins Engine Company manufactured diesel engines and had won,
over U.S. and foreign competitors, all of the diesel business for Mack,
Freightliner, White, and Paccar. With control of these three compa-
nies passing into foreign hands, 50% of Cummins' diesel engine busi-
ness was lost to foreign firms, and hundreds of American jobs shifted
overseas.
If the intent of our merger laws is to promote competition, how
does it happen that in this case, three U.S. firms were acquired by
three very large foreign companies? Does that really make for a
healthier domestic industry? The Paccar case illustrates the degree to
which enforcement and interpretation have led the law away from its
original purpose. It is for this reason that the Reagan Administration
seeks to reform the law and return it to its original mandate.
The merger laws also are abused by competitors who would use the
law not to promote competition in the industry, but to preserve their
own market share. Such cases call into question the very meaning of
the word "competition." Adam Smith viewed it as an ongoing process,
constantly in motion, but some antitrust plaintiffs apparently view it
as the preservation of a number of small players in the field. One
might as well argue that competition in a football game will be en-
hanced if you tie the star quarterback's throwing arm behind his back:
your team may lose, but more players will have a chance to carry the
ball.
An instance of this kind of Section 7 abuse is illustrated by Monfort
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of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.3 Monfort, a large meat-packing firm,
sought to enjoin one of its competitors from acquiring another large
meat packing company. Monfort was granted the injunction, even
though it was conceded that the relevant market was very competi-
tive, and would become even more competitive immediately after the
merger. Monfort did not even base its claim on a predication of collu-
sion, or of pricing below cost to drive out competitors. Indeed,
Monfort claimed that the newly merged firm would engage in such
keen competition with the number-one firm in the market, by work-
ing Saturdays and so forth, that Monfort would be caught in what it
called a "price-cost squeeze."
The trial court accepted Monfort's argument that this "squeeze"
amounted to a kind of predatory pricing. But this "squeeze" is really
nothing more than the pressure to meet some especially efficient (i.e.,
low-cost) competition. It is all too easy for a competitor who fears in-
tense competition to characterize that competition as "predatory pric-
ing." Sharp competition like this is precisely the kind of behavior the
antitrust laws should encourage.
Merger guidelines published by the U.S. Department of Justice in
1982 and again in 1984 attempted to move away from the preoccupa-
tion with concentration, but guidelines are of limited use at best. First
of all, they can be changed, quickly and easily, when administrations
change. Secondly, they are not binding upon the courts. In a very re-
cent decision, Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc.,4 a
federal district court in Indiana enjoined a hostile tender offer for
shares of a company engaged in the private contracting of school bus
transportation on the basis of market share, in spite of no adverse ac-
tion by the federal authorities.
Laidlaw sought to acquire Mayflower through a cash tender offer,
and Mayflower petitioned the court for an injunction, alleging that the
acquisition would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. After deter-
mining that Mayflower had standing to pursue a private right of action
to obtain injunctive relief, the court examined Mayflower's Section 7
claim. The court commenced its discussion with the observation that
"Section 7 is an extraordinarily clear statute,"5 and proceeded to ex-
amine the relevant line of commerce, relevant geographic market, and
the acquisition's effect on each.
The court found that "a merger between Mayflower and Laidlaw
would produce a firm controlling an undue share of the relevant mar-
kets, and would result in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in those markets."6 Laidlaw argued that despite the increase in
3. 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
4. No. IP 86-602-C (slip op.) (S.D. Ind., June 11, 1986).
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 12.
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market share, the merger would not have the proscribed anticompeti-
tive effects because entry into the market by other firms is so easy
that it will be effectively constrained from unreasonably increasing
prices. The court rejected that argument, holding that barriers to en-
try such as the high costs of insurance and capital effectively would
prohibit entry.7
It should be noted, however, that the responsibility for these "bar-
riers to entry" cannot be ascribed to Laidlaw. These are simply the
costs of doing business in this modern age. As Professor Dominick T.
Armentano observes in his recent book, Antitrust Policy: The Case for
Appeal,S such exclusions are associated with the efficiency of the firms
already in the market. They are able to provide services or products to
the consumer at a lower price than new entries. If they attempt un-
reasonably to raise their prices, the opportunity for profit will entice
new entrants, and the high start-up costs will be worth their invest-
ment. Efficiency as a barrier is hardly unfair to or injurious of con-
sumer welfare, and Laidlaw should not be penalized simply because it
is the most efficient provider in the market.
Finally, referring to the failure of either the Antitrust Division or
the Federal Trade Commission to take enforcement action notwith-
standing Hart-Scott premerger notification-which, Laidlaw urged,
should weigh heavily against an injunction-the court stated, "[tihe
agencies' opinion of a merger is not binding on this Court, and their
enforcement decisions do not necessarily reflect the current state of
antitrust law."9 Laidlaw complied with Section 7 of the Clayton Act
by filing its notification of intent to make a tender offer with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division. Neither of these
agencies took adverse action on the antitrust question, yet the court
found a potential Section 7 violation and granted injunctive relief.
The Laidlaw decision is an excellent example of why it is essential
that the law be reformed. Changes in enforcement practices provide
no assurance to the business community as long as the courts remain
free to pursue their own theories of relief.
Critics assail the "new economic learning," advances made in the
study of industrial concentration in the 1970s, as no more than a pass-
ing fashion. But it is a theory well supported by empirical evidence. A
businessman usually will not undertake a merger unless he believes
that it will enhance efficiency: that is the way he earns his annual
bonus. And logic suggests that if the market is open, and there are no
artificial barriers to competition, then the likelihood that new en-
trants to the market-competitors-will give him a run for his money
will encourage him to pass the savings along to the consumer in the
7. Id.
8. D. AiMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 31-44 (1986).
9. Id at 14 (emphasis added).
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form of lower prices. This was the thrust of Laidlaw's argument. The
single factor most indicative of competitive ability is price: it remains
the ultimate "bottom line." If a businessman is willing to bear the
costs of a merger or acquisition, and unit prices fall over time, that
indicates first, competitive ability; and second, efficiency gain.
"Efficiency" seems to have become an emotionally-charged issue in
this debate. Many critics of the Administration have argued that
nothing should be done to the merger laws to make mergers easier
because there is no "proof" that mergers in fact result in efficiencies.
This is a handy argument, but it is misleading. It is misleading first,
because the data upon which the critics base their argument is skewed.
The merger law, as enforced for the past twenty-five years, has effec-
tively discouraged many mergers that might have promised the great-
est efficiencies. But more importantly, even if the data is ambiguous,
it does not undercut the case for reform. There is no reason for the
courts to consider the efficiency issue unless all other factors indicate
that the merger raises anticompetitive concerns. In the absence of
anticompetitiveness problems, there is no case for public intervention
one way or the other. The businessman puts his money and his career
on the line: his bet is that it will be a good move. But there is no
guarantee that every merger will be a success, and it is antithetical to
traditional American notions of free enterprise to suggest that the
Government should be responsible for screening out potential failures.
The argument that "mergers don't necessarily produce efficiencies" is
a red herring. The point is that the government should leave the deci-
sion to the CEO unless there is a significant probability of anticompe-
titive effects. The Antitrust Division should not be in the investment
banking business.
The reforms proposed by the Administration are reasoned and
moderate. They will not gut the antitrust laws, or give license to
greedy monopolists. The Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification
requirements remain in place. The real abuses the law was intended
to curb-predatory pricing and collusion to the detriment of consum-
ers-remain illegal. These amendments will return the law to its orig-
inal mandate of promoting competition, efficiency, and consumer well-
being.
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